The 'Big Three' ICC Revenue Restructuring

By 2013, cricket's governance model had not been meaningfully updated since the ICC's expansion in the 1990s. All Full Members held broadly equal voting weight despite vast differences in their commercial contributions. India, England, and Australia — the three boards that generated the overwhelming majority of ICC revenue through television deals and bilateral series — chafed at a system in which Namibia and Nepal had equivalent procedural standing.

The immediate catalyst was a combination of financial pressure and opportunity. N. Srinivasan, who simultaneously served as BCCI president and chairman of India Cements (a franchise owner), had become ICC chairman in June 2014 — a governance structure that blurred national and international cricket administration in ways that had never been formalised before. Srinivasan, working with Cricket Australia's Wally Edwards and the ECB's Giles Clarke, saw a window to reshape ICC governance in their boards' favour.

The plan was presented as a modernisation: aligning governance weight with financial contribution. But the details of the revenue redistribution — heavily favouring the three architects of the proposal — made it clear this was a power grab as much as a structural reform. The proposal was brought to an ICC board meeting with minimal consultation with smaller members.

In late 2013 and early 2014, a series of closed meetings between BCCI, ECB, and Cricket Australia officials finalised the restructuring proposal. Smaller Full Members and Associate Members were largely excluded from the drafting process. When the plan was presented at the ICC board meeting in Singapore in February 2014, smaller nations were given little opportunity to negotiate material changes.

The revenue numbers were staggering in their inequity. Under the proposed 2015–2023 rights cycle distribution, India would receive approximately $570 million, Australia around $130 million, and England around $120 million. Zimbabwe, by contrast, would receive around $12 million. West Indies, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and South Africa all received significantly less than any of the Big Three despite being Full Members with long international cricket histories.

Governance changes compounded the financial restructuring: the Big Three would hold permanent seats on a new executive committee, effectively giving them veto power over major ICC decisions. Smaller boards, some financially dependent on ICC distributions for their entire cricket operations, had little real choice but to accept.

In February 2014, the ICC approved a radical governance overhaul proposed by India, Australia, and England — the so-called 'Big Three.' The restructuring gave these three nations guaranteed seats on a new executive committee, a larger share of ICC revenues, and effective veto power over major decisions. The BCCI's N. Srinivasan became the first ICC chairman from a member board, blurring the line between national and international governance.

Under the new revenue model, India received approximately $570 million from the 2015-2023 rights cycle, while smaller nations like Ireland and Afghanistan received a fraction of that amount. The 'Big Three' argued their contribution to cricket's revenue justified the distribution. Smaller nations argued it would entrench inequality and make them permanent second-class members of the cricketing world.

The restructuring was partially reversed in 2017 under a new ICC constitution pushed by Shashank Manohar, who became the first independent ICC chairman. Revenue distribution was made more equitable, and the governance model was reformed. However, the fundamental power imbalance remained. The 'Big Three' episode exposed the deep structural inequalities in world cricket and the tension between commercial value and sporting democracy. It also raised questions about the ICC's ability to function as a genuinely independent global governing body.

“What happened in Singapore was not governance reform. It was the formalisation of a power structure that had existed informally for years.”

“We were not consulted. We were informed.”

“The three biggest contributors to international cricket deserve proportionate recognition. That is not political — it is arithmetic.”

“This is the day cricket stopped being a sport and became a business. Not in a good way.”

The immediate aftermath of the 2014 restructuring was a period of deep resentment from smaller cricket nations. Several Full Members publicly stated that the distribution model threatened the viability of their domestic cricket programmes. West Indies Cricket Board's financial difficulties, which predated the restructuring but were exacerbated by it, contributed to the breakdown in player relations that led to the 2014 West Indies Test tour abandonment.

Shashank Manohar's election as independent ICC chairman in 2016 began the reversal. His constitutional reform process, completed in 2017, removed the formal Big Three governance advantages — the permanent executive committee seats were abolished and revenue distribution was made somewhat more equitable. The reformed distribution still favoured larger markets, but the egregious disparities of the 2014 model were partially corrected.

However, the structural power imbalance was never fully addressed. India's financial weight continued to dictate ICC commercial priorities in all but name. The 2014 episode had demonstrated that formal governance structures could be reshaped by financial power, and that lesson was not lost on any party.